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Abstract 
 
Cyberspace offers unique opportunities for communication and commerce, but also 
a wide range of security threats both to individuals and nation states. These threats 
create specific security challenges. This paper will examine the impact of the Treaty 
of Lisbon on the EU's response to those challenges. Prior to the coming into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 EU cybersecurity policy was highly fragmented.  
Responsibility was split between the three Pillars of the European political system: 
the Communities, justice and home affairs and the common foreign and security 
policy (CFSP). By abolishing the Pillar system the Lisbon Treaty enabled the EU to 
develop a single, unified, strategic approach to cybersecurity issues. The 2013 
Cybersecurity Strategy was a direct result of this newly-established capacity for 
coherence.  However, the key area of competence relating to the CFSP was left 
largely undefined in the Lisbon Treaty, limiting the EU's capacity to respond to 
external cyber-threats.  This paper will evaluate how the new legal personality of the 
Union and the abolition of the Pillar system affected both internal and external 
cybersecurity policy by examining one of the Treaty's most significant "loose ends": 
CFSP. It will argue that cybersecurity and external cyber-defence serve as a 
microcosm of a much wider problem of unresolved and undefined competences. 
While the Lisbon Treaty facilitated a coherent internal strategy, clarification of EU 
competence regarding the CFSP was left largely unresolved, a fact demonstrated by 
the nature of cybersecurity challenges.  By examining the EU's cybersecurity policy 
and strategy this paper will further argue that the EU's approach can be seen as an 






The Treaty of Lisbon has had a profound impact on EU policy development and 
implementation.  It amended the Amsterdam and Maastricht Treaties and 
repackaged them as the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  These Treaties now form the basis of all 
legislative acts of the EU and its structure and established the Union as a single 
legal entity.  In this new structure the European Parliament was elevated to a 
position of co-decision with the Council of the European Union, a permanent office of 
President of the European Council was founded and the European Council itself 
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formalised as an official institution of the EU.  In addition the pillar system of policy 
development and implementation was abolished, enabling previously disparate 
agencies and Commission Directorates General (DGs) to work together. 
 
This major institutional change had equally profound impacts on key areas of EU 
policy.  The new European External Action Service (EEAS) now acts as an unofficial 
if de facto foreign service, acting on behalf of the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, developing the EU’s role as an international 
actor in both security and peaceful pursuits.  The streamlining of competencies in the 
new TEU and TFEU clarified the levels of action for the EU in fields as diverse as 
sports policy, agriculture, the internal market, marine resources and the environment.  
One area where the Treaty of Lisbon has had a considerable impact is cybersecurity, 
in particular the manner in which the European Commission and its DGs approach 
that policy field.   
 
The security challenges arising through an increased use of the online sphere in 
civilian, commercial and government life are many and varied.  They touch on almost 
all aspects of the EU’s policy portfolio including criminal justice, the common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP) and protection of personal data and critical infrastructure.  
The Treaty of Lisbon had three key impacts on EU policy in this field.   First, it 
abolished the pillar system instituted in the Maastricht Treaty.  Under this institutional 
architecture the various elements cybersecurity were handled by Commission DGs, 
institutions and agencies operating independently of one another, creating great 
inefficiency and duplication.  The abolition of the pillar structure enabled entities 
dealing with foreign affairs and internal market security, previously separated under 
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the pillar system, to work together to develop a truly unified, holistic approach to 
cybersecurity.   
 
The Treaty of Lisbon also clarified areas of competence, for example in cyber-crime.  
It provided DG HOME with the right of enforcement of key pieces of hard and soft 
legislation.  Finally, in establishing the EEAS and confirming the EDA as an EU 
agency (Howorth, 2013, pp. 13–15), the Treaty enabled the EU to address the 
internationality inherent in cybersecurity challenges.   
 
Cybersecurity policy can therefore showcase the best that the Treaty of Lisbon has 
to offer: its capacity for efficiency and coherence; its enabling of joint-working 
between previously separated agencies and institutional departments; and a holistic 
strategy unattainable under the pre-Lisbon pillar system.  However, all is not perfect.  
While the Treaty of Lisbon enabled international cybersecurity issues and defence to 
be incorporated into a single strategic approach, the general competence of the new 
EU in foreign and security affairs remains unresolved.  There is a disconnect 
between the existence of competence and the use of competence (Craig, 2010, p. 
184).  The EU is undertaking military missions around the world under the aegis of 
the CFSP, establishing itself as an important international actor.  Yet EU officials 
themselves insist that the EU has no competence in foreign or military affairs.  For 
cybersecurity issues, particularly in relation to cyber-defence and the combatting of 
alleged state-sponsored or sanctioned cyber-incidents, this disconnect is particularly 
problematic.  Given the inherently international nature of cybersecurity threats and 
the impact of those threats on the EU’s commercial viability, the EU cannot be seen 
to lack a concerted response.  Yet its own officials argue that it has no competence 
to provide such a response.  Cybersecurity therefore highlights a significant 
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weakness in the Treaty of Lisbon: unclarified competences in CFSP.  By using the 
EU’s cybersecurity policy as an exemplar of both the strengths and the weakness of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, this paper will therefore argue that cybersecurity and the policy 
of the EU in that field serve as a microcosm of a much wider problem of unresolved 
and undefined competences.   
 
The paper will proceed in three sections.  The first will examine the situation in EU 
cybersecurity policy prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.  The policy 
development of the EU in the field of cybersecurity will be examined and situated in 
context with the nature of cybersecurity itself in order to demonstrate the 
fragmentation of the Union’s approach in this field.  This examination will utilise 
available academic literature as well as the acquis1 pertinent to EU cybersecurity 
policy.  It will also draw on a series of elite interviews undertaken at the EU’s 
institutions and agencies.  Subjects for interview were selected by identifying the 
agencies and Commission DGs most relevant to the EU’s cybersecurity policy, its 
development and implementation.  Interviews themselves were carried out in 
Brussels during the summer of 2014.  A second section will examine the state of EU 
cybersecurity policy after 2009, once the Treaty of Lisbon had entered into force, 
examining the key changes that Treaty caused in that policy area.  The third and 
final section will examine the CFSP, to highlight the unresolved nature of EU 
competence in this field, through the lens of EU cybersecurity policy.  The paper will 
employ an historical institutionalist approach, using the data collected and 
historiography of the acquis relating to cybersecurity to map out the EU's approach 
and demonstrate the impact of institutional variables on a policy area over time, but 
also use that policy area to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of a 
                                            
1
 The body of principles, measures, legislation and agreements making up to totality of instruments 
available to the EU (European Union, n.d.). 
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particular institutional change (in this case the treaty of Lisbon) at a particular point in 
time. 
 
This paper also aims to address a gap in research.  A strong body of literature has 
been produced examining both cybersecurity and the Treaty of Lisbon, but has 
treated these topics separately.  In cybersecurity, work has been carried out 
examining the nature and existence of cyber warfare (Dinniss, 2012; Junio, 2013; 
Liff, 2012; McGraw, 2013; Rid, 2013) as well as conceptual and data-oriented 
discussions of the overhyping the threat landscape (Dunn Cavelty, 2012a, 2010; 
Guitton, 2013; Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009; Valeriano and Maness, 2014).  The 
impact of both internal (Deibert, 2009; Hayden, 2014) and external (Schmitt, 2012) 
state and criminal activity (Buono, 2012) has also been discussed.  Academic 
examinations of the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on particular policy areas such as 
sports (Weatherill, 2014) and the environment (Lee, 2008; Vedder, 2010) has been 
equally extensive.  Comparatively little has been produced on European Union 
cybersecurity policy specifically, however.  Two internal documents commissioned 
by the European Parliament have provided a state-of-the-art of the EU’s policy 
(Cornish, 2009; Klimburg and Tiirmaa-Klaar, 2011), but the pace of change in the 
field has dated these evaluations.  This paper, in conjunction with two works 
forthcoming in 2014 (Christou, 2014; Dewar, 2014a) will develop research in this 
field. 
 
Cybersecurity in the European Union: The Pre-Lisbon Situation 
 
Prior to 2009 and the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, EU policy 
development and implementation was divided into three policy areas or pillars, 
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instituted by the Treaty of Maastricht (Bache et al., 2011, p. 161; Bretherton and 
Vogler, 2006, p. 14).  The first pillar was that of the Communities.  It comprised, inter 
alia, social and economic policy, as well as the management of the internal market 
and agriculture.  Foreign, defence and security policy comprised the second pillar 
and the third pillar focussed on police and judicial co-operation.   
 
This pillar structure was designed to formally separate economic and social 
dimensions of policy from more highly politicised areas (Bretherton and Vogler, 
2006, p. 6) such as foreign policy and criminal justice.  A consequence of this was 
that not only were policy areas divided amongst these pillars, but they were also 
subject to different decision making procedures.  Pillar 1’s institutional functioning 
was denoted by the “community method”, whereby the European Commission held 
the monopoly of policy initiative and decisions were made by the Council using 
qualified majority voting.  Pillars 2 and 3 by contrast involved intergovernmental 
processes, whereby the Commission shared the right of initiative with Member 
States or had this right confined to specific areas of activity.  Decisions were made 
by the Council of the EU, generally acting unanimously (European Union, n.d.). 
 
For cybersecurity policy, such a division of responsibilities, remits and decision-
making procedures caused significant difficulties in part due to the nature of 
cybersecurity itself.  This is a field which has come under intense scrutiny in the last 
decade, but still remains largely undefined and unclarified as a concept (Kruger, 
2012).  The security challenges generated by an increased use of information and 
communications technologies (ICT) are many and varied.  Criminal activities range 
from the use of viruses, malware and Trojan horses to illegally access secure 
networks (Dunn Cavelty, 2012a, p. 8), to copyright infringement and digital piracy 
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(Tikk et al., 2010, p. 100).  Organised criminal networks employ social engineering 
techniques such as phishing to carry out identity thefts or corporate espionage 
(Johnson, 2011, p. 23).  “Hacktivist” groups access government or official websites 
and networks to damage or deface them in an effort to engage in a form of social 
protest (Jordan and Taylor, 2004, p. 3).  All sides in a regional conflict can use the 
internet to gain a political advantage though the distribution of, for example, graphic 
images of conflict casualties, an activity dubbed “cyber-cortical warfare” (Conway, 
2005).  Government security services can strategically place routers and filters in 
order to enable or hinder access to certain data (Deibert, 2009, p. 325; Zimmer, 
2004, p. 4) or potentially weaponise these tools for military purposes (Rid and 
McBurney, 2012, p. 6).  This last example raised the political profile of cybersecurity 
to national security levels and increased academic and political discussions on the 
concept of cyber-war (Barrett, 2013; Junio, 2013; Rid, 2013).   
 
What all these potential security threats share are the same basic methodologies to 
enable unauthorised access to data or networks.  The skills and techniques used to 
infiltrate a system, carry out a data theft, dedicated denial of service (DDoS)2 attack 
or hacktivism are the same, regardless of the target.  What those who are targeted 
need to know are the aims and identities of the perpetrators3.  Once this information 
is known, the correct agencies and policy procedures can be put in place to address 
the incident and prosecute the perpetrators.   
 
The problem for cybersecurity policy and action in the EU is that the aims of 
criminals or other actors operating in cyberspace cross pillar boundaries resulting in 
                                            
2
 A DDoS attack involves automating requests for access to a website so that the servers hosting the 
website are flooded with such ac cess requests.  This overloads the server causing it to fail or crash 
(Dunn Cavelty, 2012b, p. 33)    
3
 The so-called “attribution problem” (Gaycken, 2011, pp. 80–86) 
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the various DGs of the European Commission developing policy solutions to 
particular elements of cybersecurity simultaneously, depending on the nature of the 
incident they were to address.  The theft of large quantities of digital data is clearly a 
criminal matter, subject to the policies and procedures of the judiciary and 
investigation by the police (Pillar 3).  However, if the data stolen is corporate banking 
records, access codes to stock exchanges or large numbers of customer online log-
in details, this necessarily has a significant impact on EU economic policy, potentially 
eroding trust in – and thereby use of – the internal market.  Consequently, Directive 
2002/58/EC was passed in 2002, concerning the processing of personal data and 
the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (a.k.a., the Directive 
on privacy and electronic communications).  This was amended in 2009 by Directive 
2009/136/EC.  Both of these were developed in the Communities pillar, Pillar 1.   
 
 A further example is online child exploitation.  Protection of children in their online 
activity is a social policy matter, which would normally come under the aegis of Pillar 
1.  However, the abuse of children and investigation of international paedophile 
networks is a criminal matter and so was addressed by Council Framework Decision 
2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of children 
and child pornography (amended and replaced in 2011 by Directive 2011/92 of 13 
December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children 
and child pornography).  These were developed under Pillar 3 – Justice and Home 
Affairs. 
 
The result of this separation of responsibilities and remits was the development of an 
extensive acquis relevant to cybersecurity.  In addition to the legislation cited above, 
the Commission published a Communication on a "European Programme for Critical 
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Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)"(European Commission, 2006a) in 2006.  This set 
out the horizontal framework for the protection of critical infrastructures in the EU 
(European Commission, 2012).  The Trust and Security chapter of the Digital 
Agenda for Europe (European Commission, 2010a) launched several actions 
addressing security and resilience.  The relevant sections of the Stockholm 
Programme/Action Plan (European Commission, 2010b) and the EU Internal 
Security Strategy (ISS) (European Commission, 2010c) underline the Commission's 
commitment to building a digital environment which enables the economic and social 
potential of the EU’s digital space to be achieved. 
 
This extensive acquis was further complicated by the establishment of specific 
agencies to address key elements of the EU’s cybersecurity response.  The 
European Network and Security Agency (ENISA) was established in 2004.  It 
describes itself as an “advice broker” (ENISA, 2005), a conduit for information 
between actors, sharing best practice, running simulation exercises (ENISA, 2010)  
and assisting Member States in achieving NIS goals set out in the EU acquis.  The 
Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU (CERT-EU) works closely with 
CERTs in other member states and private sector partners to detect and respond to 
cybersecurity incidents (Interview 7).  Leading the investigation and combatting of 
cyber-crime was Europol’s high-tech crime office, which would become the 
European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) in 2013 (Europol, 2013a, 2013b).   
 
Given the similarity of remits and commonality of purpose between the various DGs, 
agencies, institutions and offices involved in cybersecurity policy, one would 
anticipate there being a great deal of joint working and cross-pillar co-operation 
similar to that which occurred in certain elements of foreign policy (Bretherton and 
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Vogler, 2006, p. 32; Stetter, 2004, p. 721).  Two attempts were made in 2001 and 
2006 to generate a unified approach to cybersecurity policy for the EU (Dewar, 
2014a, pp. 1–2).  These were the Commission Proposal on Network and Information 
Security (NIS) (European Commission, 2001) and the Strategy for a Secure 
Information Society (European Commission, 2006b).  These attempts were not fully 
successful however, nor truly all-encompassing as they focussed on crime and 
citizen protection, with little or no mention of CFSP issues.  While institutionalising a 
concentration on cyber-crime, public and private sector awareness and resilience of 
critical and digital infrastructure, the NIS Proposal mentioned national security issues 
– CFSP Pillar 2 matters – only in the sense of disaster prevention, critical 
infrastructure protection and crisis management.  The Strategy for a Secure 
Information Society made no mention of defence or national security issues.  The 
reasons for this were that was that the 2006 Strategy was developed under the aegis 
of Pillar 1 at a time when the EU was engaged in an identity crisis following the 
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, the precursor to the Treaty of Lisbon.  Member 
states were wary of the potential for the proposed Constitution to confer elements of 
state-hood on the EU (Bache et al., 2011, p. 212) and degrade the individual 
member states’ national sovereignty in defence matters, part of the 
intergovernmental remit of Pillar 2.  Consequently any “high politics” element of 
cybersecurity was absented from attempts to generate a holistic strategy.   
 
The pillar structure of the EU and the silo-mentality it generated, under which 
functionaries operated separately from each other, therefore prevented a truly 
holistic approach to cybersecurity being developed.  This illustrates wider institutional 
problems in the EU pre-Lisbon for the coherence of policy solutions (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 2006, p. 32).  CFSP matters were not present in the 2001 and 2006 
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documents because of division of competences and concerns regarding the 
degradation of national sovereignty.  Separate polices and strategies with similar 
remits – online data and child protection – were being developed independently in 
separate Commission DGs, necessarily leading to duplication and inefficiencies.  
The development within the framework of the pillar structure of such a multiplicity of 
instruments to address the various challenges led to a fragmentation of the EU’s 
response to cybersecurity (Klimburg and Tiirmaa-Klaar, 2011, p. 29) across the 
institutions, agencies and DGs, a fragmentation symptomatic of the inefficiencies of 
the EU prior to 2009.  For cybersecurity policy, that fragmentation was so extensive 
that Cornish (2009, p. 29) goes so far as to argue that, in 2009, it was difficult to 
identify an EU agency or body which did not have an interest or involvement in some 
element of cybersecurity policy or operation.   
 
All this changed following the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.  That 
Treaty initiated a range of extensive institutional changes within the EU, radically 
reshaping its political and institutional structure.  
 
EU Cybersecurity Policy post-Lisbon: A New Institutional Architecture 
 
In an effort to create a more effective and efficient institutional structure, the Treaty 
of Lisbon initiated a number of radical changes in the way the EU was constructed.  
In repackaging the Treaties of Amsterdam and Maastricht into the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), the aim was ensure coherence and comprehensibility as well as increase 
effectiveness in policy development and implementation across the array of policy 
areas in which the EU is involved (Dinan, 2010, p. 154; Verdun, 2013, p. 1131).  The 
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European Parliament was placed on an equal footing with the Council of the EU by it 
being granted co-decision powers on legislation.  The European Council was 
established as a formal institution and the Union itself was established as a single, 
legal entity.  In the field of foreign and security policy, the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was to be assisted by a new European 
External Action Service (EEAS) in the fulfilment of common foreign and security 
policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CDSP) goals.  Additionally, 
the European Defence Agency (EDA) was confirmed as a formal EU body (Howorth, 
2013, p. 13). 
 
If nothing else, the specific mention of “computer crime” in Article 69(b) of the Treaty 
of Lisbon itself highlights the importance placed on cybersecurity in the EU 
(European Union, 2007, p. 65).  It is a field of crucial significance to the stability and 
viability of the internal market to due to the nature of the security challenges 
involved.  In terms of practical solutions to those challenges, the most significant 
impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on cybersecurity policy was the abolition of the pillar 
structure.  As discussed in the previous section, this structure separated a number of 
policy areas affected by the same cybersecurity challenges.  With its removal, for the 
first time functionaries from agencies and Commission DGs operating across what 
used to be the distinct areas of the Communities, foreign and security policy and 
judicial co-operation were able to work together (Interview 1, Interview 3, Interview 
5).   
 
In the field of cyber-crime, for example, DG HOME, previously under the judicial co-
operation pillar, was able to work under pillar 1 policy development processes.  This 
provided two important new capabilities.  DG HOME, and thereby the Commission 
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itself, was given the right of initiative of policy in the growing field of cyber-crime 
(interview 3).  The EC3 at Europol had developed from a high-tech crime centre to 
an established pan-European hub in its own right.  It has a multiplier effect, able to 
direct, pool and co-ordinate the resources across all the member states, removing 
the requirement for individual capacity building (Interview 6).  Before 2009, however, 
the Commission did not have the ability to generate policy or legislative suggestions 
to support the EC3 in its activities.  With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the Commission could now do so.  Secondly, the Commission now has the power of 
enforcement (Interview 3).  It could ensure that all elements of the relevant cyber-
crime acquis were implemented by all member states, and potentially launch 
infringement procedures were this implementation not undertaken.  These two 
features highlight a dramatic increase in the capacity of the EU to act in the field of 
cyber-crime and by extension internal cybersecurity issues. 
 
The capacity to work under what used to be different pillars was not restricted to 
cyber-crime, however.  In a move not possible prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, 
representatives from Commission DGs HOME and CONNECT and the new External 
Action Service come together to develop a single strategy document encompassing 
all elements of EU cybersecurity acquis.  At the time this was unique, for it 
represented the first time all three former pillars were present in the development of 
a single policy (Interview 1).  DG CONNECT (the former DG INFSO) prior to 2009 
fell under Pillar 1.  The EEAS is the new agency responsible for managing and 
developing the common foreign and security policy – the former Pillar 2.  DG HOME 
previously fell under the heading of Pillar 3.  The new, streamlined EU resulting from 
the Treaty of Lisbon enabled this unprecedented level of joint working not just 
between overlapping policy areas but between the institutional departments 
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themselves.  This is particularly evident in cybersecurity as the result of this joint 
working was the first truly holistic approach to policy produced by the Union: the 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the EU: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace 
(European Commission, 2013). 
 
A new, holistic approach to European Union cybersecurity policy 
 
Released in 2013, the Cybersecurity Strategy drew together the various elements of 
the extensive acquis pertinent to cybersecurity which previously had been developed 
independently and with significant overlap (Dewar, 2014a, p. 14).  The new Strategy 
elucidates five key objectives: achieving cyber-resilience; reducing cyber-crime; 
developing cyber-defence policies and capabilities; developing industrial and 
technological resources for cybersecurity and establishing a coherent international 
policy for EU cybersecurity based on promoting EU values.   Throughout the 
exploration of these objectives, the key goals of the various policies and strategies 
making up the previous acquis are evident.  Co-operation between stakeholders to 
develop multilateral solutions and accept joint responsibility was promoted, as 
established in the Internal Security Strategy of 2010 (European Commission, 2013, 
p. 4, 2010c).  The EU and its digital space were to be promoted as a safe place to 
live and conduct business, a key tenet of the Stockholm Programme (European 
Commission, 2013, p. 2, 2010b) and digital illiteracy was to be combatted to ensure 
universal benefit of the economic potential of cyberspace, as set out in the Digital 
Agenda (European Commission, 2013, p. 4, 2010a).  What the Cybersecurity 
Strategy did was to draw the elements together and enable the EU to move forward 
with a single strategic vision, something not possible under the previous institutional 
architecture. 
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Continuing established policies of fighting cyber-crime and ensuring resilience of 
critical and digital infrastructure in an holistic framework was not the sole innovation 
of the new Cybersecurity Strategy, however.  In what is perhaps the most significant 
development for EU cybersecurity policy, the Strategy also, for the first time, includes 
specific action points for cyber-defence under the aegis of the CFSP (European 
Commission, 2013, p. 11).  This is the first time cybersecurity capabilities are 
mentioned in the context of defence and national security capacities, and not just 
crisis management or disaster relief.  It demonstrates the seriousness placed on 
cybersecurity by the EU and reflects the political mood at the time due to a series of 
high-profile incidents which involved allegations of state involvement (Interview 3; 
Zanders, 2009, p. 2).  The DDoS incidents in Estonia in 2007and Georgia in 2008 as 
well as the discovery of the Stuxnet virus in 2010 raised international cybersecurity 
to the national security level.  Furthermore, due to this area previously coming under 
the jealously guarded mandate of the Pillar 2 (CFSP), such an inclusion 
demonstrates the capacity of the new, post-Lisbon EU architecture to generate truly 
holistic policies.  The new Strategy firmly established a unified position for the EU on 
cybersecurity.  It established clear goals including reducing cyber-crime, ensuring 
the resilience of the internal market and European information space, promoting EU 
values internationally, establishing the EU as an international actor in the field and 
developing cyber-defence capabilities.  What is clear from these goals, and the 
action points included to achieve them, is the presence in one strategy of aspects of 
policy covered under the former pillars.  The collation of these measures and goals 
would not have been possible without the Treaty of Lisbon ending – or rather, 
streamlining – the institutional framework and architecture of the pre-2009 EU. 
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However, while the Cybersecurity Strategy and its holistic approach demonstrate the 
best that the changes brought in by the Treaty of Lisbon has to offer, it is not 
complete.  The inclusion of strategic goals for cyber-defence within the CFSP 
showcase that the pillar structure of policy development has been removed.  Such 
an inclusion would have been unheard of prior to 2009.  This inclusion, though, 
belies an underlying ontological weakness in the new institutional architecture: 
competence in the CFSP.  While the EU sought to establish itself as an actor in the 
international sphere in the particular field of cybersecurity post-Lisbon (European 
Commission, 2013, p. 5), it could be argued that its scope as an actor – what it can 
actually do – is much more limited in this area when compared to criminal justice 
matters or the resilience of the internal market.   
 
Cybersecurity and the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
A common refrain for EU officials in relation to external cybersecurity and cyber-
defence is that the EU has no mandate or competence to act in this capacity 
(Interview 3).  The EU cannot engage in defence measures, nor does it wish to do so 
(Interview 3).  Furthermore, the TEU and the TFEU are explicit in acknowledging 
NATO’s role in this capacity (European Union, 2009, p. 278).  Despite some scholars 
arguing that the EU is steadily developing such capacities through the externalities of 
the CSDP aspects of CFSP (Toje, 2011, p. 44), institutionally, the EU is not pursuing 
such an agenda due to its restricted competences.  As a result, the development of 
cyber-defence capabilities as extolled in the 2013 Strategy is one which is restricted 
to the co-ordination of current Member State resources, building relations with NATO 
and promoting the sharing of information (Interview 4).  A recent progress review of 
the Cybersecurity Strategy action points highlights that, while much work has already 
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been successfully carried out in four of its five key objectives,  work in the area of 
cyber-defence is either still “ongoing” or relates to meetings undertaken, some 
informal, to encourage co-operation and dialogue (European Commission, 2014, pp. 
15–17). 
 
The situation regarding the EU’s capacity in cybersecurity issues relating to the 
CFSP is actually more complex than this for two reasons.  First, the matter of EU 
competence in external affairs is not as clear cut as some scholars and EU 
functionaries are claiming.  The problem is not simply that the EU has no 
competence to act militarily or proactively in “high politics” security matters.  That 
competence has not been clearly defined in spite of the Treaty of Lisbon’s goal of 
streamlining competence, coherence and comprehensibility.  This has created a 
disconnect between, on the one hand, the existence of competence as outlined in 
Article 5(3)-(4) TEU (European Union, 2012, p. 18) and the practical application of 
that competence (Craig, 2010, p. 184).   Second, the nature of cybersecurity 
challenges necessitates a global, international perspective to resolution given the 
inherent transnational nature of those challenges and the rise in allegations of state-
sponsored or sanctioned cyber incidents. 
 
A Question of Competence 
 
Following the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2(4) of the new TFEU 
stipulates the nature of exclusive, shared and supporting competence in matters 
such as the customs union and marine resources (exclusive), the internal market 
and environmental policy (shared) and sports policy (supporting) (European Union, 
2009, pp. 50–51).   The area of the CFSP, by contrast, remains largely unclarified 
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(Craig, 2010, p. 182).  It is still treated as a separate area of competence, but not 
labelled as such (Laursen, 2010, p. 10).   
 
Under the terms of Article 24 TEU and Article 2(4) TFEU the Union’s competence in 
foreign and security affairs shall “cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions 
relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common 
defence policy that might lead to a common defence” (European Union, 2012, p. 30).  
However, Article 24(1) TEU goes on to place a series of restrictions on the Union’s 
capacity to act in that field.  The Union is not able to adopt legislative acts pertaining 
to areas of CFSP policy.  While the Parliament has, post-Lisbon, been elevated to a 
position of co-decision with the Council, in CFSP matters that role is restricted to 
consultation and recommendation under Article 36 TEU (European Union, 2012, pp. 
35–36).  Furthermore, distinct rules of decision-making and policy implementation 
remain (Dinan, 2010, p. 155), echoing elements of the pre-Lisbon architecture in that 
the European Council and Council of the EU dominate (Craig, 2010, p. 182).  CFSP  
is even specifically exempted from Article 352 TFEU, the so-called “flexibility” clause 
(Craig, 2010, p. 183).  Article 352(1) TFEU states that if action by the Union is 
necessary to attain a Treaty objective, but the necessary powers are not set out in 
the Treaties, the Council of the EU can act unanimously to “adopt appropriate 
measures” (European Union, 2009, p. 196).  However, Article 352(4) specifically 
states that Article 352 itself cannot be used for attaining CFSP objectives (European 
Union, 2009, p. 196).     
 
The result is that the CFSP is “a specific policy area with a separate set of legal rules 
and treaty basis, a specific budget line, distinct set of institutions and equipments 
[sic], as well as a staff with competencies, know-how and experiences” (Rieker, 
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2009, p. 704).  CFSP matters therefore remain a de facto pillar of EU policy, 
considered separately (Wouters et al., 2008, p. 161) to other areas of competence in 
the EU’s Treaties, the basis of the Union’s operation, and also to other areas of the 
EU’s mandate for action such as agriculture, tourism, sport and energy.  It is 
deliberately left out of the definitions of the types of competence and their 
concomitant subject areas.  One official (Interview 2) described the combination of 
this absence with the series of restrictions placed on the EU’s institutions a making 
the Commission and EEAS a “toothless tiger” as it has no right of initiative or 
enforcement of policy or action.  Furthermore, the Court of Justice of the EU has no 
jurisdiction over CFSP matters (European Union, 2012, p. 30) 4, further reducing the 
Union’s capacity to compel member states to adhere to policy decisions.  In 
cybersecurity policy, this can be contrasted with internal measures.  The 
Commission’s DG HOME, as examined above, now has the right of enforcement in 
certain key policy areas relevant to cybersecurity (Interview 3).   
 
On the face of things, such a situation regarding competence should severely restrict 
the EU in the international arena.  The EU is, however, an important actor in 
international politics, illustrating a disconnect between the existence of competence 
and the application or use of competence.  While the EU has no competence to take 
decisive foreign or defence policy action, the Union has in effect become a 
‘normative power` in foreign policy (Dinan, 2010, p. 545; Manners, 2002, p. 29).  This 
is particularly problematic for cybersecurity policy, given the rise in state-sponsored 
international cyber-incidents. 
 
                                            
4
 Except in issues brought by an individual person where an act directly affects them (see Article 263 
TFEU).  However, as indicated above, the EU cannot adopt legislative acts relating to the CFSP. 
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The Existence of Competence v. The Use of Competence: The EU as a normative 
power 
 
As an international actor the EU has been described as an economic giant but a 
political pygmy (Dinan, 2010, p. 545), calling into question the extent to which the EU 
is a successful actor in international global politics.  The Union has a great deal of 
influence in the development of economic policy in its 28 member states and in 
global commerce.  Historically, however, some scholars have argued that this 
economic power has not translated into international influence (Dinan, 2010, p. 545).  
The power-politics involved in developing state-like apparatus and nomenclature led 
to the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2003: member states did not want the EU 
to develop into a super-state, with more supranational power and sovereignty being 
granted to Brussels.  A consequence of this is precisely the vague, ill-defined and 
complex nature of the EU’s competence in foreign and international security policy 
following the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
Yet, the EU is an actor in international politics and security.  It is one of the members 
of the Quartet for the Middle East peace process.  Military forces under the EU 
banner have been deployed to Libya, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (EEAS, 2014a).  In the EUPOL Afghanistan police mission, the Union 
assisted in civilian reconstruction and police and justice reform (Gross, 2012, p. 
109).  The Union has also been active in counter-terrorism (Zwolski, 2012, p. 993) 
and border control as recently as the ongoing Libyan conflict (EEAS, 2014b).  With 
specific regard to cybersecurity and cyber-defence, the EU action is relatively recent 
(Interview 4), due to the relative youth of the EU’s military capacity due to the 
perception of the EU as a civil, socio-economic organisation.  The EDA’s main tasks 
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in cybersecurity and cyber-defence focus on supporting members states in their own 
actions, as well as ensuring a pooling of resources to avoid duplication.  In a similar 
way that ENISA operates as an advice broker, the EDA ensures that best practice 
and information is shared amongst the member states, but only insofar as that 
information is able to be shared.  However, this is also a key role for the EDA across 
the full range of its activities.  Information-sharing and efficiency building are not 
restricted solely to cybersecurity or cyber-defence matters.  This highlights a 
particular aspect of the EU in CFSP in general: its presence as a normative actor.   
 
Where the EU can operate internationally is in the projection of its normative 
influence.  In the specific examples of the CFSP/CSDP operations, the norms and 
patterns of behaviour and action include humanitarian action, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding.  The principles behind these operations are not hard security 
solutions to the challenges faced.  While military force is deployed, it is in specific, 
restricted circumstances relating to humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.  The 
EDA describes itself as an agency specialising in providing support and co-
ordination to military assets in efforts to increase efficiency, but not as a military arm 
in itself.  This softer approach reflects principles established historically in the 
“Petersberg tasks” which define the type of military action the EU can undertake 
(EEAS, n.d.).  The original declaration was expanded by the Treaty of Lisbon to 
include not just humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace-making tasks, but also 
disarmament, military advice and assistance and post-conflict stabilisation (EEAS, 
n.d.; Western European Union, 1992). 
 
These operations demonstrate that the EU is an actor, if a somewhat sui generis 
actor (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 35).  It operates on principles of assistance 
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and peacekeeping, so-called “soft power” norms.  It has military resources to deploy  
but these are not deployed in active, deliberate combat situations in the same way 
that NATO forces were deployed in Libya in 2011.  While these operations 
demonstrate that the EU is an international security actor, there are identifiable 
characteristics to its approach which affect the capacity of the EU as an actor, 
characteristics which are brought into sharp relief by the nature of international 
cybersecurity challenges.  These challenges are not restricted to one policy area.  
However, they are also not restricted to one geographical area.  Illegal botnets 
operating in EU Member States may be made up of zombie computers based all 
over the world, operated from central servers based in, for example, South East 
Asia.  The anonymising effects of cyberspace enable perpetrators to carry out 
security breaches while making it, if not impossible to identify them, costly to do so in 
time and resources and makes it difficult to establish judicial jurisdiction.  This has 
particular attractions for international criminal networks in seeking to evade 
identification and prosecution.  Accurately locating and identifying perpetrators – the 
so-called “attribution problem” (McGee et al., 2013; Schmitt, 2013, pp. 29–31; 
Tsagourias, 2012, p. 242) – is one of the biggest challenges in addressing 
cybersecurity incidents and tackling cyber-crime. 
 
In terms of tackling cyber-crime the problem of attribution is a labour-intensive but 
technical exercise.  According to officials at the EC3, Europol acts in concert with an 
extensive network of law enforcement, public and private partners and technicians to 
identify and tackle international criminal networks utilising the Internet (Interview 6).  
However, when the investigation of cybersecurity incidents points not to criminal 
networks but to nation states, attribution of incidents poses serious problems for the 
EU.  In recent years a series of high profile network and information security 
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breaches have raised the profile of cybersecurity on the political agenda due to 
strong allegations of state involvement (Interview 3).  Estonia ‘07, Georgia ‘08 and 
Stuxnet have all involved alleged state involvement (Dinniss, 2012, pp. 176,289–
291).  The issue for the EU in these cases is not just that the accurate attribution of 
these incidents to particular nation states is problematic, but that these incidents can, 
in certain circumstances of international law, constitute an armed attack (Dewar, 
2014b, p. 10).  While the TFEU contains a “mutual assistance” clause, the lack of 
clearly defined competence in CFSP and deferral to NATO in matters military, 
coupled with the retention of a de facto foreign policy pillar with separate decision-
making procedures, means the EU has little capacity to act once state involvement is 
suspected in a cybersecurity incident, beyond its role in resource co-ordination. 
 
Under Article 42 TEU civilian and military resources are to be made available to the 
Union “for the implementation of the CSFP” (European Union, 2012, p. 39).  By 
extension, the computer network resources of the member states in the area of 
military or cyber-defence capabilities can therefore be called upon.  However, 
Paragraph 4 of Article 42 stipulates that the use of such action can only be proposed 
by the High Representative and deployment is subject to unanimous agreement in 
the Council (European Union, 2012, p. 39).  Coupled with the established norms of 
soft power, this places a severe restriction on the capacity of the EU to act in the 
cyber domain, despite clear threats to the internal market and commercial viability of 
the EU’s digital space.  While botnets used for criminal activities such as the theft of 
data, identity details or money can be investigated and taken down through joint 
working between member states and other international partners, botnets apparently 
used by state-sponsored or sanctioned entities pose different political problems.  If a 
national government is identified as being behind a botnet attack, EU law 
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enforcement agencies and their extensive resources are not involved in any 
responsive action.  The incident is escalated to the level of CFSP discussion and 
therefore subject to more restricted modes of joint working.  The EEAS and EDA are 
heavily involved in developing diplomatic and practical tools to address these issues, 
but are once again hamstrung by the limitations of competence expressed in the 
Treaty of Lisbon, limitations caused by a lack of clarity in the CFSP and the 
entrenchment of that policy area as a separate pillar. 
 
The result therefore, is not just a disconnect between the existence of competence 
and the use of competence.  There is also a disconnect between the drive for 
efficiency and coherence in the Treaty of Lisbon, demonstrated to good effect in 
internal cybersecurity matters, and the elements of EU policy left out of that 
efficiency drive: the CFSP and external cybersecurity issues involving alleged state 
action.  The EU’s competence in the field of CFSP is, according to its own 
functionaries, very restricted (Interview 3, Interview 8).  The EU is developing as an 
international security actor, but of a very particular kind.  The lack of clear CFSP 
competence post-Lisbon and the precise nature of the EU’s capacity as an actor can 
be illustrated through its cybersecurity policy.  It remains restricted to projecting its 
particular normative stance, one found in the 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy itself: 
protection of fundamental human rights and promotion of core EU values, in short a 




In reforming the treaties on which the EU is founded the Treaty of Lisbon aimed for 
simplicity (Christiansen and Dobbels, 2013, p. 1164).  It was intended to tackle 
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perceived deficiencies in effectiveness, efficiency and democratic accountability.  It 
sought to streamline processes and responsibilities and achieved, in many respects, 
a more coherent and comprehensible European Union.   
 
Although these goals were not directed at any specific policy area, they can be most 
clearly recognised in the field of cybersecurity.  By abolishing the old pillar system, 
which lead to duplication of policy development and a highly convoluted and 
fragmented approach to cybersecurity, offices that were not able to work together 
were now able to do so under the new institutional structure of the EU (Interview 3).  
As a result, a single strategic approach was developed which encompassed the 
areas of the common market, critical physical and digital infrastructure, internal 
security and defence.  Cybersecurity policy therefore demonstrates the 
achievements of the Treaty of Lisbon in its streamlining goals.  Decision-making has 
been made more coherent, duplication has been reduced and a more holistic, unified 
approach to a single policy area has been developed. 
 
However, this process has been only partially successful.  In the area of the CFSP, 
the competence of the EU remains unclarified.  In terms of cybersecurity and, more 
specifically, cyber-defence, this lack of clarity restricts the capacity of the EU to 
develop more active responses to security challenges, on a par with its successful 
efforts in law enforcement, data protection, civil education and system 
harmonisation, areas where the EU’s competence is more clearly defined.  Due to 
different rules of action and decision-making to other areas, the CFSP remains a de 
facto separate pillar.  It therefore creates a grey area of policy, which translates into 
an institutionalised complexity of responsibilities and action, particularly with regard 
to those cybersecurity challenges incorporating allegation of state involvement.  .  
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This means that the Union’s cyber-defence capabilities are curtailed by 
institutionalised weaknesses unresolved by the changes brought in by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, despite the goals of simplification and coherence.  Although the Union has a 
strong presence on the international arena, that presence is limited to particular 
normative values, namely peacekeeping, peace-making and humanitarian activities. 
 
Cybersecurity as a policy area for the EU therefore demonstrates the best and worst 
of what the Treaty of Lisbon has to offer.  It shows how the new institutional structure 
of the EU has the capacity to carry out more streamlined policy development and 
activity, but only in specific circumstances, demonstrating where the inherent 
ontological weaknesses of the Treaty lie: the clarification of the EU’s status and 
capacity as an international actor.    
 
It has only been five years since the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and, 
although examples of its best features are evident in the 2013 Cybersecurity 
Strategy, the continued development of the EU as an international actor provides 
exciting opportunities for further examples of the institutional changes introduced by 
that treaty as well as further opportunities for academic research.  
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